BRSK Governance Model

The BRSK governance model is built on the principles of Proof of Stake (PoS), enabling decentralization and community involvement. Its core logic can be summarized as follows, with similarities seen in other networks such as Cosmos and EOS:

• Token Staking and Delegation: Token holders, including validators, can "bond" their tokens by staking them. They can delegate their tokens to any validator or candidate in hopes that the latter becomes an active validator and can later re-delegate as desired.

• Validator Ranking: Validators are ranked based on the amount of bonded tokens they have, with top-ranking validators becoming active validators. They can share a portion of their block rewards with their delegators.

• Slashing for Malicious Behavior: Validators may face slashing penalties for bad actions, such as double signing or instability.

• Unbonding Period: Validators and delegators have an unbonding period to ensure tokens remain staked if malicious behavior is detected, during which penalties apply.

1) Rewards

• Validator updates and rewards distribution occur daily around UTC 00:00, aimed at reducing the costs of frequent staking updates and block reward distributions. To ensure equity, rewards are intentionally delayed to allow for fair distribution:

  • Rewards are not sent immediately but accumulated in a contract.

  • Upon receiving updates from the validator set, multiple cross-chain transfers trigger the release of rewards to the relevant validator's custody address.

  • To facilitate synchronization, N days’ worth of rewards are distributed only on N+2 days.

2) Slashing

• Slashing acts as a part of on-chain governance to penalize malicious or negative behavior. Anyone can submit a slashing request against a validator with evidence of misconduct. Successful submissions could yield significant rewards, and there are specific cases of slashing:

  • Double Signing: If a validator signs multiple blocks with the same height and parent block, they can be removed from the validator set and face token deductions.

  • A portion of slashed BRSK is awarded to the person who submitted the slashing request.

3) Availability

• The effectiveness of BRSK relies on validators being able to produce blocks in a timely manner. Validators may miss their turn due to hardware, software, or network issues, introducing instability. An internal smart contract will track missed blocks, and if a validator's missed block count exceeds a set threshold, their rewards will be withheld and shared among better-performing validators.

4) Governance Parameters

• Multiple system parameters control BRSK's behavior, such as slashing amounts and cross-chain transfer fees. These parameters will be collectively determined by the BRSK Validator Set through a proposal voting process based on their staked tokens.